Feasel v. Idaho Transp. Dep\u27t Clerk\u27s Record v. 1 Dckt. 35720 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-23-2008
Feasel v. Idaho Transp. Dep't Clerk's Record v. 1
Dckt. 35720
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Feasel v. Idaho Transp. Dep't Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 35720" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2251.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2251
B LAW CLERK '". - - - - -  
I I IN THE 
SUPEME COURT 
I I OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
I I GARY ALAN FEASEL, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 
---- 
Appenledfrom the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial 
District d f h e  State of Idaho, in ondfor ADA Cowtty 
Hon D. DUFF MCKEE, District Judge 
- 
-- 
- 
MICHAEL J. KANE 
Attorney for Appellant 
ROBERT A. WALLACE 
I I Attorney for Respondent ====== 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
I Petitioner-Respondent, I 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, 
STATE OF IDAI-10, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Supreme Court Case No. 35720 
Respondent- Appellant. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE D. DUFF MCKEE 
MICHAEL 1. KANE 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
ROBERT A. WALLACE 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... PAGE NO . 
.............................................................................................................. REGISTER OF ACTIONS 3 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVEW AND STAY. FILED JANUARY 9. 2008 ........................ 4 
NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD. FILED JANUARY 22. 2008 .................................... 8 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF. FILED APRIL 25. 2008 ..................................................... 10 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF. FILED MAY 21. 2008 ....................................................................... 25 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF. FILED JUNE 13. 2008 ............................................................ 35 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. FILED SEPTEMBER 2. 2008 ................................................... 42 
NOTICE OF APPEAL. FILED SEPTEMBER 30. 2008 .............................................................. 51 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS ..................................................................................................... 54 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 55 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD ...................................................................................................... 56 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INDEX TO THE CLERK'S RECORD .................................................... PAGE NO . 
..................................................................................................... CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 54 
...................................................................................................... CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 55 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD ...................................................................................................... 56 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, FILED SEPTEMBER 2, 2008 ................................................... 42 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 .............................................................. 51 
.................................... NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD, FILED JANUARY 22, 2008 8 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STAY, FILED JANUARY 9, 2008 ........................ 4 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF, FILED APRIL 25, 2008 ..................................................... 10 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF, FILED JUNE 13, 2008 ............................................................ 35 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS .............................................................................................................. 3 
....................................................................... RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, FILED MAY 21, 2008 25 
INDEX TO THE CLERK'S RECORD i 
Date: 11/21/2008 . .Zh Judicial District Court - Ada Count1 
Time: 10:49 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 1 Case: CV-OC-2008-00408 Current Judge: D. Duff McKee 
Gary Alan Feasel vs. ldaho Department Of Transportation 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Gary Alan Feasel vs. ldaho Department Of Transportation 
Date Code User Judge 
1/9/2008 NCOC CCTOONAL New Case Filed - Other Claims D. Duff McKee 
PETN 
AFFD 
MEMO 
ORDR 
MlSC 
NOAP 
NOTC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
ORDR 
STlP 
NOTC 
MOTN 
CCTOONAL 
CCTOONAL 
CCTOONAL 
DCTYLENI 
CCEARLJD 
CCSTROMJ 
CCSTROMJ 
CCAMESLC 
CCWRIGRM 
CCDWONCP 
DCTYLENI 
CCWRIGRM 
CCSTROMJ 
CCWRIGRM 
Petition for Judicial Review and Stay 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Stay 
Memorandum Supporting Request for Stay 
Order Governing Judicial Review 
Administrative Record for Judicial Review 
Notice Of Appearance (Kane for State of ldaho, 
Department of Transportation) 
Notice of Filing Agency Record 
Notice of Court Reporters Estimate 
Notice of Court Reporters Estimate 
Notice of Payment of Court Reporter's Estimate 
Stay of Agency Action (D/L Suspension Stayed) 
Stipulation for Entry of Stay 
Notice of Lodging Transcript 
Verified Motion to Enlarge Times to Settle and 
Brief Administrative Appeal 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
D. Duff McKee 
3/12/2008 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Denying Moiton to Enlarge Times. Settle D. Duff McKee 
Record, Etc ... 
MlSC 
NOTC 
BREF 
BREF 
BREF 
NOHG 
HRSC 
NOTC 
HRHD 
DEOP 
CDlS 
STAT 
APSC 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI 
CCBARCCR 
CCTOWNRD 
CCTEELAL 
CCCHILER 
CCCHILER 
CCAMESLC 
DCOATMAD 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI 
CCTHIEBJ 
Transcript Filed D. Duff McKee 
Notice of Filing Transcript on Judicial Review D. Duff McKee 
Petitioner's Opening Brief D. Duff McKee 
Respondent's Brief D. Duff McKee 
Petitioner's Reply Brief D. Duff McKee 
Notice Of Hearing D. Duff McKee 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled D. Duff McKee 
08/27/2008 09:30 AM) Oral Argument 
Notice of Change of Firm Name D. Duff McKee 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on D. Duff McKee 
08/27/2008 09:30 AM: Hearing Held Oral 
Argument 
Memorandum Decision D. Duff McKee 
Civil Disposition entered for: ldaho Department Of D. Duff McKee 
Transportation, Defendant; Feasel, Gary Alan, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/2/2008 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed D. Duff McKee 
Appealed To The Supreme Court D. Duff McKee 
ROBERT A. WALLACE JAM 8 9 2008 
Attorney at Law, ISB# 1921 
815 Park Blvd., Ste. 130 
Boise, Idaho 83712 
Telephone: (208) 342-0100 
Facsimile: (208) 343-2069 
,I. DAVID NAVARRO, CleA 
By ATOONE 
Q E P l I N  
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, 
Petitioner 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF: 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW and STAY 
Idaho Code §§ 18-8002A(8), 
67-5270 et seq. and LRC.P., Rule 84 
ITD File No. 807001283566 
Idaho D.L. No. ZD298621A 
cFee Category: R2, $78.00 
Petitioner Gary Alan Feasel, holder of Idaho Operator's License (herein "D.L.") NO 
ZD298621A, petitions pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 18-8002A (8) and 67-5270 et seq. for review, 
and for stay under Idaho Code § 67-5274 and I.R.C.P., Rule 84(m). 
Petitioner's attorney states and certifies: 
The name of the agency for which judicial review is sought is the Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 
The title of this district court is as shown above. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STAY--Page 1 of 4 
. .
The hearing was held November 27,2007 and final order was entered December 12, 
2007 in an agency proceeding styled as: 
" IN THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
In the Matter of the 
Driving Privileges of 
GARY ALAN FEASEL 
) D.L. No. ZD29862lA 
) FILE No. 807001283566 
1 
The oral portion of the record was recorded by Hearing Examiner Michael B. Howell, 
Attorney at Law. Pursuant to his custom it has by now been returned to the Idaho Department of 
Transpoaation, Hearing Unit, 33 11 West State Street, Boise, Idaho 83720, and is in the custody 
of that agency. 
The issues asserted are: (a) the evidence showed that the presence of prozac in 
petitioner's urine but did not indicate any particular level or impairment or intoxication; instead 
showed that it had never had any effect on defendant, and this fact was not rebutted; (b) the 
examiner applied an erroneous or nonexistent legal standard -- the provabiiity of a criminal 
charge of driving under the influence - rather than the statutory requirement that "the test results 
indicated.. .the presence of.. .drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18- 
8004.. . ." (e) said legal standard "...presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in 
violation of section 1808004.. ." is 
(i) unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous and cannot support withdrawal of the 
privilege of driving; and 
(5) deprives drivers of procedural due process because it appears to be conclusive upon 
the arresting officer's $? 18-8002A(4) affidavit, there being no express authority for the hearing 
examiner to consider the probative value (if any) of the presence of a drug under 4 18-8002A(7); 
PETITION FOR SODICIAL REVIEW AND STAY--Page 2 of 4 
00005 
alternatively (d) that the findings of the Examiner were against the clear weight of the 
testimonial and documentary evidence, which showed that there can be no '"failure" of a urine 
test: such tests are qualitative (not quantitative), and cannot correlate time of driving, driver's 
physical or mental impairment (if any) or blood levels with one another in any way - urine tests 
only show that a person had at some time taken the drug whose presence is indicated. 
A written transcript has been requested. By service of this petition on the agency 
petitioner requests a written transcript of all oral proceedings, an estimate of the cost thereof so 
petitioner may timely pay it, and agency-produced copies of the written record. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays the court order: 
1. That pursuant to Idaho Code 5 67-5275(1) and I.R.C.P., Rule 84(g)(l)(A), time 
be extended 42 days from the date of filing this petition for any fiuther necessary 
cost estimates, payment for and preparation of agency transcript; 
2. That the order of December 12,2007 be stayed pending adjudication of this 
petition, and any rehearing or appeal thereot 
3. That the court find, pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279, that said order was not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, that it was contrary to 
the legal standard applicable, that the legal standard as applied was 
unconstitutional and violated petitioner's rights to substantive and procedural due 
process; and/or that it was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion; 
4. That this case he remanded to the agency with directions to vacate the suspension 
of petitioner's vehicle operator's license ab initio; 
5. That the agency pay petitioner's costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing this 
appeal; and 
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6. For such other relief as the court deems just. 
DATED this 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
K? I /  
I hereby certify that on t of January, 2008 1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing PETITION REVIEW AND STAY to be &laced in the U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid and addressed as stated below; - transmitted by facsimile (fax) as so 
indicated; and/or - hand delivered to the following: 
Office of the Attorney General 
Department of Transportation 
33 11 West State 
Boise, ID 83703 
State of Idaho, Dept. of Transportation, Hearing Section 
P.O. Box 7129 
I Boise, ID 83707-1 129 
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MICHAEL J. KANE 
KANE & TOBIASON, LLP 
1087 West River Street, Suite 100 
Post Office Box 2865 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2865 
Telephone: (208) 342-4545 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323 
Idaho State Bar No. 2652 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH .kJDIcIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
In The Matter Of: ) 
1 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, ) Case No. CV OC 0800408 
1 
Petitioner, ) NOTICE OF FILING 
) AGENCY RECORD 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, 1 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW Michael J. Kane, Special Deputy Attorney General and attorney for the 
Respondent, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, in the above-entitled matter and 
hereby notifies the Court and all parties that the agency record in the above-entitled mairer was filed 
on January 17,2008. 
DATED this day of January, 2008. 
KANE & TOBIASON, LLP 
Attorneys for Respondent 
NOTICE OF FILING AGENCY RECORD - P. 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the a day of January, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below and addressed to 
the following: 
Mr. Robert A. Wallace / U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law Hand Delivesy 
815 Park Blvd., Suite 130 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83712 F a c s i m i l e  
[Facsimile: 343-2069] 
~ ~ ~ k l 4  /z<< 
MICHAEL J. KANE 
I NOTICE OF FILMG AGENCY RECORD - P. 2 
I 
ROBERT A. WALLACE 
Attorney at Law, ISB# 1921 
290 Bobwhite Ct., Ste. 260 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone: (208) 342-0100 
Facsimile: (208) 343-2069 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF: 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, 
Petitioner. 
Case No. CV OC 0800408 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF 
I. FACTS 
On his way to work at about 7:08 A.M., July 20,2007 Petitioner rear-ended another 
North-bound motorist as both were waiting for a green lee-turn signal on Broadway turning 
West onto Front Street, Boise, Idaho. Neither the records of this nor the resulting criminal cases 
contained an accident report, suggesting there was no significant damage and no injuries. 
Petitioner had slurred speech, appeared sleepy, and acknowledged taking medications. 
He was processed for DUI and arrested. Administrative Record for Judicial Review (herein 
"AR"), Pages 5,28 (AR 5,28); Reporter's Transcript Page 14, Lines 18- 19 (RT 14: 1 9 ,  Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, Paragraphs 11 and IX (FFCLO 1,3; AR 28,30). He 
cooperated with his processing officer, took a breath test showing no trace of alcohol, AR 2, and 
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submitted also to a urine test which was requested because he stated he was taking prescription 
drugs. AR 4, RT 14-15. Defendant ultimately plead guilty to an infraction, following too 
closely. AR 24. 
A report of the State Laboratory, AR 9-10, ultimately was received by the Idaho 
Department of Transportation. That report detected the presence of Fluoxetine (Prozac), noting 
it was currently prescribed, but opining nothing about its concentration nor its effect (if any) 
upon intoxication, impairment or other relationship to the activities of driving. This report was 
the basis for the Department initiating this proceeding by suspending petitioner's license. AR 11. 
Petitioner requested a hearing which was held November 27,2007 before Michael 
Howell, Esq. sitting as designated hearing examiner for the department. Petitioner presented 
facts about the four medications mentioned to the officer, AR 4, still in his medicine cabinet, RT 
9-13, which all contained warnings against mixing with alcohol (e.g., RT 10: 10-13; RT 1 1%-I 1) 
or using without knowledge of their effects. Citation infra. Petitioner corroborated the negative 
alcohol BAC test by testifying he consumed no alcohol nor had any problems with impairment 
from any of these medications alone or in combination in the past. RT 15:7-8, 16:23-17:l. The 
Prozac, in particular, he had been using for three years. RT 14:22-3. The toxicologist testified 
that long-term use of most medications increased tolerance and therefore diminishes their effect 
on the person. RT 19:9-15. 
Petitioner's toxicologist presented more unrebutted testimony: the urine test measured 
only that Prozac had been taken by Petitioner, RT 21: 18-25. That fact alone could not support 
any inference of impairment. 22:l-13; 23:2-8. He also underscored the label warnings' 
language that driving was not a prohibited activity for users of Prozac, but that users should be 
familiar with their effects before operating machinery. RT 20:12-16. When asked if the urine 
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test results show anything wrong with a person's driving or ability to operate a vehicle, the 
unequivocal answer was 'Wo." RT 23:16. The unrebutted testimony was that there may have 
been anything i?om a large to a trace amount of Prozac in his system, but a urine test could be 
neither "passed" nor "failed." RT 23:9-24: 17. 
11. ISSUES 
Is a qualitative blood or urine test enough to form the basis of an administrative license 
suspension program like that set forth in Idaho Code 8 18-8002A without some quantitative 
measurement or clear factual connection to a driving pattern or other evidence of impairment 
attributable to those specific drugs? 
Does the term "competent evidence" combined with "presence" of drugs give adequate 
notice of what conduct is prohibited or allowed to drivers? 
Must there be a factual, logical connection between detected drugs and actual impairment 
for that evidentiary test to be passed or failed? 
Did the legislature require there must be a nexus between impairment and substances, in 
view of the DUI statute's more specific ("per se") references to amounts of alcohol needed to 
prove impairment in blood, breath and urine? 
111. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Idaho Code § 18-8002A(8) authorizes judicial review of a hearing officer's decision on 
an administrative license suspension in the manner provided for judicial review of final 
agency actions under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
Code. Upon such judicial review, the hearing officer's decision must be affimed unless 
the court finds that the hearing officer's findings or conclusions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory 
authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. 
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I.C. $67-5279(3)." 
State v. Kane; 139 Idaho 586, 589-90,83 P.3d 130 (Ct. App. 2003). 
"The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of department 
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's 
license. See 1.C. $$49-201,49-330,67-5201(2), 67-5270. In an appeal from the decision 
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this Court reviews the 
agency record independently of the district court's decision. Marshall v. Idaho Depk of 
Transp., 137 Idaho 337,340,48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court does not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. 
I.C. $67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers 
to the agency's findiigs of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton 
Corp., 130 I d a h o m ,  926,950 P.2d 1262,1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 
P.3d at 669. In other words. the azencv's factual determinations are binding on the 
- .  - 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as 
the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 
Urruta v. Blaine ~ o m t -  ex rel. B$. of Comm's, &41daho 352,357,2 P.3d 738,742 
(2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. I.C. Ej 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must 
demonstrate that the agency erred in a m e r  specified in I.C. Ej 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payetie County Ed. of County 
Comm'rs, 13 1 Idaho..4l,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48 
P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not &med on appeal, 'it shall be set aside . . . 
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.' I.C. Ej 67-5279(3)." 
State v. Talavera; 127 Idaho 700,905 P.2d 633 (1995) [Emphasis added.]; See also Matter of 
Driver's License of Archer, Docket No. 33725, Court of Appeals of Idaho (2008). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
An absurd example illustrates why urine tests should either be held insufficient to 
suspend licenses, or require more scrutiny than they received here. A literal reading of 
Code $1 8-8002A, Subsection (4)(a) would allow prosecution of any driver whose blood or urine 
-
test f?om an approved state laboratory disclosed the mere presence of caffeine, or ibuprofen, or 
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an antidepressant. But it does not, because the additional clause after "presence or drugs or other 
intoxicating substances" says "in violation of section 18-8004 ...." It would exceed the statutory 
authority of the Department to even process, much less find on a clear record l i e  this one, a 
"failure" of an evidentiary test without clear evidence of a violation. And a violation is shown 
.by "other competent evidence." That evidence has to be evidence of impairment, or there is no 
violation of 18-8004. Idaho Code $ 18-8004A(4)(a) would not then furnish a basis for even 
initiating suspension proceedings. 
DUI prosecutions, subject to rules of evidence and judicial gatekeeping, are proper 
forums for proceedings involving drug impairment, as clear fkom Idaho Code § 18-8004(3) For 
reasons set forth below, Idaho Code § 18-8004A(4)(a) is not. Using dmg presence tests to 
suspend licenses is just too uncertain and beyond statutory defmition to begin administrative 
action that affects driving privileges. Maintaining proceedings l i e  these, therefore, should be 
held beyond the statutory authority of the department. 
A. "COMPETENT EVIDENCEn IS A VAGUE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARD FOR DECISION 
Defendant submits that the term "competent evidence" is at best ambiguous, if not vague. 
As unrebutted by toxicological testimony in this case demonstrated, urine tests in particular are 
meaningless if used to prove impairment or intoxication. Considering these kinds of "junk 
science" passing or failing also conflicts with more specific statutory levels of alcohol set for 
urine as the legislature has set which govern impairment per se. They should not trigger notices 
of suspension without a prior determination that they caused impairment or were intoxicating. 
The statute provides no review for that prior to hearing, allows the department to engage in a 
mini-DUI trial as it did here, and allows a result beyond the terms and the stated purposes of the 
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ALS program by authorizing use of evidence beyond the passage or failure of the evidentiary test 
itself. 
Without some gatekeeping control of state lab test results, this vague branch of the DUI 
statute is simply unreliable on its face. It encourages administrative use of "scientific" evidence 
that actually proves nothing about impairment or intoxication. It is not "competent" because it 
logically proves nothing about the crime. Simply because that result might be theoretically 
admissible, as the product of the state lab, does not make it relevant to nor even connected to a 
violation of law. Moreover, as noted in Section D below, it actually conflicts with more specific 
legislative provisions in the DUI statute that prescribe levels of alcohol in urine. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that constitutional challenges to statutes' vagueness 
may be either facial or as they may be applied to other persons or situations. State v. Cobb et al; 
132 Idaho 195 (1998, Fn.l), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,610,93 S.Ct. 2908, 
2915,37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519,4 L.Ed.2d 524 
(1960), or that the ordinance can only be constitutionally applied to some of the conduct 
described in it. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186,71 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This doctrine requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be 
worded with sufficient clarity and defiiteness to permit o r d i i y  people to understand 
what conduct is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. 
An enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defied. Id. Due 
process requires that all be informed as to what the state commands or forbids and that 
persons of common intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal 
law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho lB, 197,969 P.2d 244,246 (1998). A statute may be void 
for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern 
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law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712,69 
P.2d at 132. 
State v. Casano, 140 Idaho 461,95 P.3d 79 (Ct. App. 2004). 
When does a person's drug use become a violation of the DUI law? Most people assume 
it would only occur when there is competent evidence that such use caused impairment or was 
intoxicating. This should be the plain meaning of "competent evidence," and it is how the statute 
should work. But the way the program actually works, every chemical test that shows a urine 
sample tainted with any drug will trigger a suspension. See Kane, supra.' Without some 
mechanism for review or meaninghl contest to officers' field suspicions, other than mere 
presence of any drug triggering automatic suspensions of operators' driving privileges, both the 
statute and the process of (i 18-8002A give insufficient notice of what drivers can and cannot do. 
B. WITHOUT PROOF OF CAUSATION URINE TESTS ARE NOT 
COMPENT EVIDENCE 
The common legal definition of "competent" in the field of evidence applies to witnesses, 
not their testimony. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 601 et seq. To stretch it to cover scientific 
evidence like urine tests requires an even more strained reading of the rules of evidence, because 
scientific evidence is covered by Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rules 701 et seq. and presupposes the 
admitting foundation of expert witnesses. The entire suspension process is devoid of any expert 
analysis of the effect of a "failed" drug result and driving. In this case it was affirmatively 
proven that none existed. 
I Kane describes the process in a case like this: "If an evidentiary test of blood or urine was administered rather 
than a breath test, the peace officer or the department shall serve the notice of suspension once the results are 
received. The sworn statement required in this subsection shall be made on forms in accordance with rules adopted 
by the department. 
Upon receipt of such documentation from a law enforcement office the ZTD must suspend the person's driver's 
license. I.C. 8 18-8002A(4)(a)." [Emphasis added.] 
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Therefore the term "competent evidence" as used in Idaho Code 8004(3), if adopted to 
give content to 9 18-8002A, is ambiguous. As applied to this case, where an expert without any 
rebuttal whatsoever stated that the urine test proved nothing, it is "junk science." 
It is not necessary to construe statutes if their meaning is clear and unambiguous. The 
reason the phrase "competent evidence" is ambiguous is that specific levels of bodily fluid levels 
of alcohol have been set by the legislature. Other than alcohol levels, the law leaves open (very 
far open) the areas where "competent evidence" may show violation of the law prohibiting 
driving while under the influence of "alcohol or drugs or other intoxicating substances." 
Drug evidence is logically and legally connected (because the legislature says it is) to 
intoxication or impairment. But it doesn't violate the statute if it is not in fact connected with 
intoxication or impairment, or in any way is causally connected to that element of the crime of 
DUI. The department's automatic suspension process must, at the time such information is 
acquired, vacate the suspension. Failure to do so is merely to rubber-stamp the suspicions of a 
field officer, neglecting the critical fact-fmdiig role of the hearing process. 
Similar exclusion of non-causal scientific evidence, otherwise admissible, is discussed in 
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho; 138 Idaho 589,67 P.3d 68 (2003), which held it not 
competent to support the causation element of plaintiffs claim: 
"The instant case is similar to Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844,934 P.2d 17 
(1997), in which we upheld the grant of summary judgment because of the lack of 
competent evidence showing causation. In Bloching, the plaintiff had been taking beef 
insulin for his diabetes. He suffered one seizure every four to six weeks because of 
hypoglycemic reactions to insulin. His insulin prescription was then filled with a 
combination of beef and pork insulin because the pharmacy was out of beef insulin. The 
pharmacist stated that the blend of beef and pork insulin was a direct substitute for beef 
insulin. Immediately after the plaintiff began using the insulin blend, he suffered a 
seizure. As he continued using the insulin, he suffered seizures on a daily basis, and they 
were considerably more violent than those he had previously experienced. After a week 
he discontinued using the insulin blend, but he continued to suffer violent seizures. 
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The plaintiff sued the pharmacy for negligence. His treating physician testified in his 
deposition that although it was possible that the switch to the insulin blend caused 
permanent injury, in hi opinion it had nothing to do with the seizures. The district court 
ultimately dismissed the lawsuit on the pharmacy's motion for summary judgment 
because there were not sufficient admissible facts to demonstrate a genuine dispute 
regarding the proximate cause of the plaintiffs alleged injuries. On appeal, we affrmed 
the dismissal because 'the record contains no credible, admissible testimony in opposition 
to Albertson's motion for summary judgment.' 129 Idaho at 847,934 P.2d at 20. The 
temporal relationship between the taking of the insulin blend and the onset of more 
fkequent and severe seizures was not sufficient to prove causation. 
We have previously held that a lay person was not qualified to give an opinion about the 
cause of a medical condition or disease. Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844,934 
P.2d 17 (1997) (lay person was not qMed to testify that the seizure he suffered 
immediately after using a blend of pork and beef insulin was caused by the insulin); 
Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990) (husband was not 
qualified to testify that conduct by sheriff's deputies on April 15, 1987, in grabbing and 
shaking his wife was a cause of her cardiac arrest and death over eleven months later); 
Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164,409 P.2d 164 (1965) (patient was not qualified to 
testify that hi injury was caused by physician's treatment). In his lower extremities, both 
of which indicated he had a possible history of cardiac problems. The cardiologist also 
testified that Mr. Swallow's use of "fat burner" pills containing ephedrine, which is 
associated with heart attacks, clouds the issue of the cause of his heart attack. 
Opinion Evidence § 207 as follows: 
Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, injury, or death of a person is 
wholly scientific or so far removed from the usual and o r d i i  experience of the average 
person that expert knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent opinion, only 
an expert can competently give opinion evidence as to the cause of death, disease or 
physical condition. 
118 Idaho at 214.796 P.2d at 91. 
The same considerations that disqualified the lay testimony in the above cases apply here. 
Whether or not the Cipro taken by Mr. Swallow was a cause of his heart attack is a matter 
of science that is far removed fkom the usual and ordinary experience of the average 
person. A jury, comprised of lay people, is simply not qualified to determine that issue 
without the assistance of expert testimony establishing that Cipro can cause a myocardial 
infarction. Absent such testimony, any finding in that regard would be based upon 
speculation. In granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court wrote, '[Iln 
this case without some reliable expert testimony relating Cipro to myocardial infarction, 
there is no chain of circumstances from which causation reasonably could be inferred.' 
The district court did not err in granting Dr. Blahd's motion for summary judgment." 
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Without the connection of causation, expert testimony is simply inadmissible, irrelevant and "not 
competent." Similar restrictions should be demanded of "scientific' material used by 
administrative tribunals, especially when their processes are automatically triggered by any lab 
report showing "drugs." All triers of fact must be gatekeepers of such material in determining 
violation of the law. That should be their legal responsibility. Here it was affimatively avoided. 
The department's legal responsibility to assess the passing or failing of the test was thus avoided. 
The department should have considered the facts before it, not simply rubber-stamped the 
suspicions of the officer at the scene of a non-injury, unreported minor vehicle accident. Failure 
to do so was an abuse of discretion or, minimally, failure to consider substantial competent 
evidence in the record. 
C. STATUTORY ADMISSIBILITY IS NOT ENOUGH 
Petitioner acknowledges that the state lab report is intended by the legislature to be 
considered by courts and hearing examiners. But in this case Petitioner's expert rendered his 
unrebutted opinion that, with respect to urine testing, qualitative results do not have any 
connection to impairment or intoxication. Otherwise stated, in this case it is an unrebutted 
scientific fact that mere presence of various drugs or intoxicating substances has nothing to do 
with a person's ability to drive. 
However, statutory foundation is not enough for admissibility, relevance or - for 
suspension purposes - a  decision that a test was "failed." Relevant evidence may be excluded if 
its probative force is outweighed by unfair prejudice. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 403. 
Competency (if applicable to evidence, as opposed to witnesses) must also require some 
gatekeeping as to reliability. Comment to Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 601 (I), pp. 2-3, State 
v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 671,682 P.2d 571 (1984). Had the examiner in this case considered the 
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF --Page 10 of 15 
unrebutted evidence of the toxicologist, he could not have found that Petitioner "hiled" his urine 
test simply because Prozac was present. His reliance instead upon other facts apparent to the 
officer did not discharge his responsibility to determine passage or failure of the test - his 
statutory responsibility under Idaho Code § 18-8002A. 
"This Court reaffirms that the appropriate test for measuring the scientific reliability of 
evidence is I.R.E. 702.(footnote omitted)". State v. Gleason; 123 Idaho 62 844 P.2d 691 (2002), 
discussing State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878,811 P.2d 488 (1991). Because the per se prong of 
518-8004 specifically quantifies certain concentrations of alcohol in breath, blood and urine as 
per se violations of law, Stafe v. HardesQ, 136 Idaho 707,39 P.3d (Ct. App. 200'2), the 
concentrations or other measurements of such substances must also create an inference of 
influence or intoxication. 
The approach of the department would have reached the same result if Petitioner's urine 
had contained caffeine and ibuprofen compare - Page 4 above. The concern is not the nature of 
the drugs, but the absence of any causal connection between their mere presence and the legal 
requirement that in order to violate 18-8004, a person must be under the influence of such a 
substance, a combiiation of that and alcohol, or be intoxicated. 
Under the rule of lenity, criminal or penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of 
the accused. State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,913 P.2d 1196 (1996);. State v. Barne,~, 124 Idaho 
379,380,859 P.2d 1387,1388 (1993). 
Evidentiary principles discussed in Subparagraphs A and B above protect doctors and 
other litigants tiom unwarranted "junk science." Even though administrative tribunals aren't 
bound by the rules of evidence themselves, somewhere in the process drivers must have the 
opportunity to get the equivalent of pretrial review, judicial oversight, and standards applicable 
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to experts and witnesses who claim to have special knowledge that a wrong occurred (but in fact 
prove nothing but mere association). The same adjudicative evil rejected in Swallow, supra -- 
that foreign substances in bodily fluid are harmhl- is presented by this case. The court has 
power and duty to review the "science," to require a showing of at least some nexus with the 
statutory element(s) of intoxication or impairment. If there is none, the department must be 
denied its use. 
D. DRUG PRESENCE WITHOUT CONNECTION TO IMPAIRMENT 
CONFLICTS WITH OTHER PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE LAW 
Idaho Code $18-8004(1) specifically provides that driving under the influence is a crime, 
--
and that it can be either the result of alcohol at specified levels, or a combination of drugs and 
alcohol. Though Idaho Code $18-8004(2) enjoins prosecution of any person taking an approved 
BAC test whose results are below .08 -- compare Sfafe v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,913 P.2d 1196 
(1996) --Idaho Code $18-8004(3) qualifies that injunction by providing that a sub-.08 BAC like 
defendant's does not bar prosecution if other "competent evidence" shows impairment or driving 
under the influence. Its exact language says that the "competent evidence" must show a 
violation of the statute itself, which means a violation of Idaho Code $ 18-8004(1)(a). That 
subsection contains the actual conduct prohibited. Such conduct is plainly being under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs, intoxicating substances or a combination thereof. 
The statute goes on to specifically provide for levels of alcohol in blood, breath and 
urine. These per se levels express the only legislative direction about what may be intoxicating 
or impairing. The rest is left to supposition. 
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Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another). See Ace Realty, Znc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742,749,682 P.2d 1289, 1296 (Ct. App. 
1984). If the legislature gave a specific direction about how urine tests can be considered, the 
attempt to read the law allowing their use for other purposes creates an ambiguity in the law. 
When a court must engage in statutory construction, its duty is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 154,75 P.3d 206, 
208 (Ct.App.2003). In so doing, we look to the context of the statutory language in 
question and the public policy behind the statute. Id .; State v. Cudd, 137 ldaho 625,627, 
51 P.3d 439,441 (Ct.App.2002). When an ambiguous statute is part of a larger statutory 
scheme, we not only focus upon the language of the ambiguous statute, but atso look at 
other statutes relating to the same subject matter and consider them together in order to 
discern legislative intent. Shank, 139 Idaho at 154, 75 P.3d at 208; State v. Paciorek, 137 
Idaho 629,632,51 P.3d 443,446 (Ct.App.2002). Even when a statute is not ambiguous 
on its face, "judicial construction might nevertheless be required to harmonize the statute 
with other legislative enactments on the same subject." Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103, 
106,785 P.2d 667,670 (Ct.App.1989). We also are obligated to apply the doctrine of 
lenity, which requires courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the 
accused State v. Wees, I38 Idaho 1 19,124,58 P.3d 103, 108 (Ct.App.2002) [Emphasis 
added.] 
Stofe v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846,848,965 P.2d 206,208 (Ct.App.1998). The same 
standard should apply to statutes governing civil forfeitures, as important, valuable rights or 
privileges are at stake. 
The legislature actually never defined "influence" or "intoxicating substances." 
However, it specifically provides in the same statute for blood, urine and breath levels of alcohol 
only in the "per sew definition of the DUI offense itself. These levels there set were held to be 
elements of the crime itself. Sfate v. Hardesty, 136 ldaho 707, 39 P.3d (Ct. App. 2002). Unless 
evidentiary tests are similarly specific, or at least have some connection to the harm prohibited 
by the law (intoxication, impairment), using them to summarily forfeit drivers' licenses violates 
constitutional principles of .fair notice about conduct proscribed, clear rule of decision for the 
department, and substantive due process of law with respect to what must be proven to show that 
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no violation of the DUI statute was or could be shown by the particular brand of "evidence" used 
in these proceedings. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The unrebutted record established the urine test indicated a mere presence of drugs, with 
no quantitative measurement and no connection to impairment or intoxication. The hearing 
examiner ignored this fact and the overwhelming weight of others showing no connection 
between Prozac and the suspicions of the officer triggering the suspension case. 
He abused his discretion and departed from the department's statutory mandate that only 
a test "failure" can trigger or sustain license suspension, by fmding irrelevant the evidence that 
the drug test before him could be neither passed nor failed. But even if it was proper to consider 
it, the statute itself was not clear enough to admit tests other than those pertaining to alcohol or 
other drugs that have a clear connection to impairment. Petitioner therefore respectfully requests 
the court order the department to restore his driving privileges. 
ROB~RT A. WALLACE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
In The Matter Of: 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, 
Petitioner, 
1 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0800408 
) 
) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, 1 
) 
Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW Respondent, STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION (hereinafter "Department"), by and through its attorney of record, Michael J. 
Kane of the fm Kane & Tobiason, LLP, and hereby submits the Respondent's Brief on review to 
the above-entitled Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On July 20, 2007, sometime shortly before 7:00 a.m., Gary Alan Feasel (hereinafter 
"Petitioner") rear-ended a vehicle at the intersection of Broadway and Front Street, Boise, Idaho. 
The police were called, and Petitioner had contact with two (2) peace officers - M.Chally and J. 
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Tucker. According to the affidavit of Officer Tucker, Petitioner admitted to having taken Ambien 
CR, Lithium, Prozac and Wellbutrin. Officer Tucker performed field sobriety tests upon Petitioner 
and found that Petitioner exhibited slurred speak, impaired memory, and that he failed the gaze 
nystagmus, walk and turn, and one leg stand tests. (R. 003-004). 
Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), and submitted to a breath 
alcohol test. That test resulted in .00% BAC. (R. 004). It also transpired that Petitioner was 
driving without privileges and was cited accordingly. (R. 005). 
Although an administrative license suspension (ALS) was served on Petitioner, that was 
cancelled pending the result of a urine test. (R. 008). In due course, a urinalysis report performed 
by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Laboratory was received indicating the presence of 
fluoxetine, commonly known as Prozac. (R. 009). 
Petitioner was notified on October 30, 2007, of an administrative license suspension. @. 
01 1-013). Petitioner requested an administrative hearing in a timely fashion. (R. 014-015). 
On November 27, 2007, a telephonic hearing was had before Hearing Officer Michael 
Howell. Petitioner presented evidence from his daughter which consisted of reading to the hearing 
officer the warning labels attached to the prescription bottles on Petitioner's Ambien, Wellbutrin, 
Lithium and Prozac. As to Ambien, the evidence was that it caused drowsiness or dizziness, and 
Petitioner had been warned that his ability to drive might be impaired. Petitioner was further 
warned to use care until he became familiar with its effects. (Tr. 9). As to Wellbutrin, Petitioner 
was warned that drowsiness was a side effect, and was further warned to use care when operating a 
car. (Tr. 10). As to Lithium, Petitioner had been warned that a side effect was drowsiness, and was 
further warned to use care when operating a car. (Tr. 11). As to Prozac, Petitioner had been 
warned that taking the medicine "may lesson [sic] your ability to drive." (Tr. 11). 
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Petitioner testified that he had a valid prescription for the aforementioned dfugs. (Tr. 13). 
Although Petitioner admitted to taking the four (4) pills for the four (4) medications, he was unclear 
which he had taken at approximately 5:30 a.m. that day. He stated that he had been on Lithium and 
Prozac for three (3) years, but Ambien and Wellbutrin for only about a month. ( r  14-15). He 
claimed he had never noticed a problem in the past while taking the four medications. (Tr. 15). 
Petitioner also presented testimony kom Loring Beds ("Beals"), a toxicologist, pertaining 
to the effects of Prozac. Among the generally hypothetical nature of Beals's testimony was an 
opinion that only when a person is not reasonably certain of the effects of Prozac is when he should 
not drive. (Tr. 21). Beals then went on to opine that urine tests were generally useless in that they 
did not draw conclusions regarding quantitative amounts. (Tr. 21-23). 
Petitioner also presented the hearing officer with "the tape" regarding "Mr. Feasel's 
statements that he made or didn't make to the officer about what supposedly knew [sic] about 
taking the drug . . . ." (Tr. 24-25).' 
The hearing officer upheld the suspension. (R. 028-030). The hearing officer specifically 
noted that he had considered the exhibits. (R. 028). The hearing officer found that "[w]hile alcohol 
requires quantification, a violation for drugs requires a determination of the presence of drugs, 
combined with indications of impairment." (R. 029). Finding that the condition of the driver at the 
time of the incident is all that is relevant, the hearing officer found that "[tlhe officer gave 
numerous indications that the driver was impaired. Those observations combined with the results 
showing the presence of drugs were sufficient to establish a violation of LC. $ 5  18-8004 and 18- 
8002A." (R. 030). 
' Although it is not clear in the transcript, "the tape" consists of two (2) exhibits - B and C - which are CD 
recordings of approximately two (2) hours worth of conversations between Petitioner, police officers, and medical 
personnel, both at the scene of the accident and at the Ada County Jail. 
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Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review. (R. 038-041). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code 5 67-5279(1). The COLIII shall affirm the agency action 
unless the court finds "that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." 
Idaho Code 5 67-5279(3). 
ARGUMENT 
Before beginning an analysis of the Petitioner's claim, it is important to identify those 
issues that are properly before a hearing oflicer in a given case. Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(7) lists 
the five (5) areas to be dealt with by the hearing officer in a hearing on a suspension. These are: 
1. Whether the peace officer had legal cause to stop the person; 
2. Whether the officer had legal cause to believe the person had been driving under 
the influence; 
3. Whether the test results showed an alcohol concentration in violation of Idaho 
Code $5 18-8004,18-8004C or 18-8006; 
4. Whether the test results for alcohol concentration were conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of Idaho Code $ 18-8004(4) or whether the testing equipment was 
functioning properly when the test was administered; or 
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5. Whether the person was informed of the consequences of submitting to an 
evidentiary test. 
In all cases, the burden of proof is on the person requesting the hearing to a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Indeed, the statute directs the hearing officer not to 
vacate the suspension unless one of the five aforementioned findings occurs. 
Because the bulk of the Petitioner's briefing is an attack on the statutory scheme 
pertaining to a suspension for violation of the Administrative License Suspension Act, it is 
appropriate to outline how the statutes apply to one who appears to be under the influence of 
drugs while driving a vehicle. 
First, "[ilt is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of .. . drugs . .. to drive or 
be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state ... ." Idaho Code 5 18- 
8004(l)(a). 
Next, when an individual shows an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, "other 
competent evidence of drug use other than alcohol" is used in determining the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. Idaho Code 4 18-8004(3). 
Finally, when a person is charged with driving under the influence of any drug, the fact 
that the drug was obtained legally "shall not constitute a defense against any charge of a violation 
of the provisions of this chapter. Idaho Code 5 18-8004(7). 
As to the ALS, the ultimate finding of the defendant's guilt or innocence on the DUI 
charge is not a factor. 
The facts as found by the hearing officer shall be independent of the determination 
of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out 
of the same occurrence. The disposition of those criminal charges shall not affect 
the suspension required to be imposed under the provisions of this section. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF - P. 5 
Idaho Code 8 18-8002A(7). 
At the ALS hearing, the results of any tests for the presence of drugs shall be admissible, 
as is the sworn statement of the arresting officer and the accompanying documents. The burden 
of proof is on the Petitioner. Idaho Code 3 18-8002A(7). 
ALS appeals are governed by the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the 
Attorney General. IDAPA 39.02.72.003. 
The rules of evidence as described by Attorney Generd Rule 600 are as follows: 
Evidence should be taken by the agency to assist the parties' development of the 
record, not excluded to frustrate that development. The presiding officer at 
hearing is not bound by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. No informality in any 
proceeding or in the manner of taking testimony invalidates any order. The 
presiding officer, with or without objection, may exclude evidence that is 
irrelevant, unduly repetitious, inadmissible on constitutional or statutory grounds, 
or on the basis of any evidentiary privilege provided by statute or recognized in 
the courts of Idaho. All other evidence may be admitted if it is of a type 
commonly relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. The 
agency's experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge may be 
used in evaluation of evidence. 
IDAPA 04.1 1.01.600. 
Petitioner begins with an assertion that the term "competent evidence" of drug use 
contained in Idaho Code 5 18-8004(3) is unconstitutionally vague. Respondent respectfully 
submits that the aforementioned subsection is not relevant to the analysis. This is so because on 
its face the subsection deals with how drug use can be considered when a person's alcohol 
concentration is less that 0.08 "in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant." In 
contrast, the ALS does not concern itself with the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, 
when a peace officer signs a sworn statement that there is legal cause to believe: a person had 
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
drugs, the Department shall suspend the person's driver's license, which only may be vacated 
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upon a demonstration that the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person, that the 
officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving while under the influence 
of drugs, that the testing was faulty or that the person was not informed of the consequences of 
submitting to evidentiary testing. Idaho Code 5 18-8002A(7) 
This statute has explicitly been found to be remedial in nature and not punitive. State v. 
Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 915 P.2d 14 (1996). Hence, the portion of Idaho Code 5 18-8004 
dealing with competent evidence to find guilt or innocence has no application. 
In any event, the term "competent evidence" is not unduly vague. The Idaho courts on 
numerous occasions have held that substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Center, 136 
Idaho 579, 38 P.3d 617 (2001); Curtis v. M H King Company, 142 Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 
(2005); Stolle v. Bennett, 145 Idaho 44, 156 P.3d 545 (2007). As can be seen, the definition of 
substantial and competent evidence is virtually identical to that standard of evidence used in 
administrative hearings as set forth in the Attorney General Rules. 
Petitioner argues that evidence of drugs in one's system should not be admitted by the 
hearing officer absent some demonstration of causation. Otherwise, the argument goes, a person 
taking a simple pain killer could be prosecuted under the statute. It is submitted that it is not 
possible to read the statute outlawing driving under the influence in the way Petitioner suggests. 
In order to he guilty of the crime of driving under the influence, a person must have drugs in his 
system, must be driving and, most important, must be "under the influence" of the drug. Idaho 
Code 5 18-8004(1)(a). The term "under the influence" means impairment of physical or mental 
function that relates to one's ability to drive. This may be shown by direct or circumstantial 
evidence. State v. Bronnenberg, 124 Idaho 67,856 P.2d 104 (1993). No specific degree or state 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - P. 7 
ooo3lC 
of intoxication is required, but only a showing that enough of the substance has been ingested as 
to influence or affect the ability to drive. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). 
Impairment may be demonstrated by observation of some type of ascertainable conduct or effect. 
State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 71 1, 800 P.2d 107 (1990). Given the relaxed level of evidence that 
the hearing officer may consider under the rules, it is clear that the hearing officer may take 
scientific evidence of a drug into consideration when accompanied by evidence of impairment. 
That is certainly the case here. 
In this matter, the Petitioner admitted to ingesting four (4) different drugs, any one of 
which could reasonably be seen to have affected his driving. As a review of the tape of the 
conversations with Petitioner will demonstrate, Petitioner was nodding off while behind the 
wheel while the first officer on the scene was speaking to him. Although the tape is painhlly 
unclear in sections, there is enough on the tape to demonstrate that the Plaintiff was in almost a 
trance-like state and that he claimed that he had used Ambien approximately eight (8) or nine (9) 
hours before for the first time. Ambien, as is well known, is a sleep agent. Given the failure of 
several field sobriety tests, not to mention the rearend collision, causation cannot be seriously 
challenged. 
Petitioner also asserts that there must be a quantitative component to the drug testing. 
Without this, it is asserted, the test is nothing more that junk science. In fact, it has been 
explicitly ruled otherwise. The State is not required to establish a quantity of drugs in a 
defendant's system in a prosecution for driving under the influence. State v. Lesley, 133 Idaho 
23, 981 P.2d 748 (1999). If this is so in criminal prosecutions, it must follow logically that the 
same ruling applies to remedial administrative proceedings. 
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Petitioner asserts that "it is an unrebutted scientific fact that mere presence of various 
drugs or intoxicating substances has nothing to do with a person's ability to drive." (Petitioner's 
Brief, p. 10). Given this "unrebutted" evidence, the hearing officer should not have found that 
the Petitioner "failed" his urine test "simply because Prozac was present." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 
11). 
In fact, the hearing officer did not find that Petitioner "failed" a drug test. Rather, it was 
found that there were numerous indications that the driver was impaired. Petitioner seems to 
limit his argument to Prozac, probably because the sole scientific test admitted by the hearing 
officer demonstrated Prozac. However, the hearing officer could not ignore the fact that 
Petitioner admitted to ingestion of three (3) other drugs capable of affecting his driving, one for 
the first time the night before. Nor should the hearing officer have ignored the fact that 
Petitioner specifically admitted under oath the ingestion of those drugs.2 
Simply put, it was not improper for the hearing officer to consider all of the evidence 
before him, including the scientific evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, this court may only vacate the hearing officer's findings if they are 
unconstitutional, in excess of statutory authority, made upon unlawful procedure, not supported 
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole or arbitraiy. Given the overwhelming evidence 
of impairment coupled with the admissions of the Petitioner, both to the police and to the hearing 
2 The fact that the laboratory test only referred to Prozac is not particularly relevant in this case. It is unknown 
whether Wellhutrin, Amhien or Lithium were even searched for in the testing, and it is unknown whether the 
Wellbutrin, Lithium or Ambien had time to metabolize to the point where it could be found in the Petitioner's urine 
at the time of the taking of the test. Petitioner did not argue that he was "only" affected by Prozac at the hearing. 
When questioned at the scene of the accident, Petitioner only referred to the taking of Ambien. It was only later in 
the course of events that Petitioner admitted to taking the other drugs, including the Prozac. 
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officer, coupled with the scientific test, the hearing officer's decision was not only wholly 
reasonable, it was virtually dictated by the facts. 
DATED this 2 ~ '  day of May, 2008. 
KANE & TOBIASON, LLP 
BY: 
MICHAEL J. KANE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF: 
Case No. CV OC 0800408 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, I 
Petitioner. I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An administrative agency has a lot on its side when appealed. Its advocates always 
argue that their clients strive to reflect the legislature's intent. Clearly, the law does impose upon 
permitted drivers the double burden of prevailing at hearings and appealing carefully crafted 
. fmdings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Abundant law supports the discretion of administrative tribunals to select and interpret 
facts. They have nearly unlimited authority to do so. Respondent properly relies on that settled 
legal principle, and petitioner does not urge this court to reject it. 
"It is an old adage among trial lawyers that when the law is on your side you argue the 
law, when it is not you argue the facts, and when you have neither you pound the table." 
State v. Hicks, No. 79143-1 (Wash. Supreme Court, 4/24/08), Chambers, J., concurring. 
I 
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Petitioner points to the written, statutory law and practical operation of the statutory 
scheme's operation, and the preponderance of relevant facts. With deference to the skill and 
experience of counsel for respondent, and the limited role of the court, when an agency exceeds 
its statutory authority, the settled law on administrative discretion and judicial review can appear 
like table-pounding. 
11. QUESTIONS ON REVIEW 
Petitioner agrees that respondent, like every administrative agency, may find and apply 
facts within the scope of its job to determine. Respondent's job is defmed by I.C. $18-8002A. 
This case asks: 1) Could the department go beyond the evidentiary (urine) test itself, when 
chalIenged that such test failed to show a violation of the DUI law, and 2) Was it in so doing 
allowed to rely entirely on facts other than that evidentiary test? 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. Procedural Design Limits the Scope of Ageoey Inquiry 
Respondent correctly reminds the court that the ALS process is essentially a self- 
executing, remedial procedure designed by the legislature to remove drivers from the road aRer 
they fail an evidentiary test. It is designed to impose a certain, swiR remedy for failure of 
defined chemical tests. It requires no action &om a driver other than to get arrested, fUrnish a 
sample ofblood, breath or urine for chemical analysis, allow his arresting offcer to serve 
material and then transmit same to respondent, the state department of transportation. One of 
these items is proof that an evidentiary test was failed. 
1. Because it works, evidence of only one "chemical test" is pertinent 
As is the case with every urine or blood evidentiaxy test under $18-8002A, this 
proceeding did not begin until the results ofpetitioner's urine test were obtained. The presence 
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of prozac in that test was the event that triggered the department's authority to suspend. Once 
that material is in the hands of respondent, after 30 days of service a license is gone. Period. If a 
hearing is requested only limited objections can be lodged, and each driver has the burden of 
establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the objections are valid. 
On the other hand, under $18-8002A(7)(c), the driver must regain his license if, after 
objecting, a preponderance of evidence shows that: 
(c) The test resuIts did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or 
other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004 ... [emphasis added] 
To "violat[e] ... section 18-8004" a chemical test result must show impairment. If 
challenged by a hearing request, the department's function and authority does not increase. It 
remains limited by the same statute: the one that gives it authority to suspend if a test is failed. 
Neither the department nor its hearing examiner get increased authority to try a DUI case. They 
remain bound to decide, in accord with 5 18-8002A(7), if a test showed the presence of drugs, 
and if that presence was shown by the test to be in violation of § 18-8004. 
Petitioner respectfully submits that this question subject defines the outer limits of what 
respondent was to consider in this proceeding. Was that test failed or not? Did it "show a 
violation" of the DUI law or didn't it? If it did, the automatic suspension would be upheld. If 
petitioner showed by a preponderance of evidence that that test did not show a violation of DUI 
laws, he was entitIed to return of his license. 
There is no other way to read subsection (c) of 18-8002A(7). The Iegislitture wanted a 
driver's chemical test result to govern respondent's withdrawal of his license--without a hearing. 
The law could and should not increase the department's authority if a hearing is requested and 
conducted. 
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Much of respondent's argument is about how much information the record gave the 
hearing examiner to conclude that there was a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. But 
evaluating "competent evidence" of intoxication is not, as respondent essentially concedes, the 
department's role under § 18-8002A. It is to suspend licenses when an evidentiary test shows 
the DUI law was violated. The statute posits a urine test (in the singular) like petitioner's 
qualative result could do so. It nowhere says every urine test showing the presence of drugs 
does. 
B. The Legislature's Intent That Suspension Be Swift Requires Also That It 
Be Simple 
I 
State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,913 P.2d 1196 (1996) holds that when the legislature 
said one test in 5 18-8004, it means one. The court should follow its logic and policy. This 
principle has been respected by the legislature for 12 sessions, though other stronger 
amendments and drug laws have proliferated. 
The legislature has given the department no other ground for including additional 
evidence in its inquiry. It specifically authorizes challenge to the probative value of a single test, 
and only that. If no hearing had been requested, the suspension would have simply remained in 
place, respondent would have imposed as a self-executed event. It would not have mattered if 
the drug present in petitioner's urine had been caffeine, ibuprofen or heart medicine. 
However, had it been ibuprofen, and an affected driver had presented the evidence 
presented here, Mr. Howell could not have appropriately relied on surrounding circumstances to 
decide that Advil in his urine proved he was intoxicated in violation of 8 18-8004. He would 
have had to iind substantial evidence that Advil's presence violated § 18-8004. He could not 
have done so, on the evidence of this record. He wuld not do it for Prozac either. 
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IV. THE DEPARTMENT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY 
The hearing examiner, like the department, was not supposed to see if a DUI could be 
proven from everything he could learn from the record, its witnesses andlor its information, 
whether offered by petitioner or investigated by himself. He was only authorized to hear 
challenge that the urine test showed presence of something "in violation of '  $18-8004 under 
$18-8002A (7)(c). "Failing" evidentiary tests is what $ 18-8002A is about. When a driver 
proves (as petitioner did) that the results of a given tests did not establish ("show") a violation of 
LC. $ 18-8004 the job of the department is done. 
Otherwise stated, all the department is supposed to do under $18-8002A is penalize a 
driver that fails an evidentiary test. Once it received any test result, and only then, did it initiate 
that action. That action was timely challenged. The hearing officer was authorized to take and 
review evidence about that challenge. But then he looked at and relied completely on evidence 
beyond that limited subject. He looked at all evidence of DUI, not evidence about the urine test. 
The only evidence about the urine test or the effect of Prozac on petitioner was 
presented by Mr. Beals, petitioner and his family. That evidence was preponderant, if not 
conclusive, that he did not then nor ever had any previous problems with that drug. The 
evidence was preponderant that the test itself, even if showing the presence of the drug in his 
urine, could not show impairment or his condition the time he drove. And impairment 
("intoxication") is necessary to violate $18-8004. 
Only the foregoing facts about the urine test should have been considered by the 
hearing examiner. The rest of the "competent evidence" of DUI is not about what the test (or 
"presence of' any drug) does or does not show. Such evidence arguably subjects the statute to 
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vagueness and statutory construction grounds, as argued in the main brief. It was offered 
nevertheless by petitioner to illustrate what still remains an unrebutted fact: that no connection 
between a violation of the statute and the actual drugs shown by the test existed nor was shown 
to exist by the test nor by its surrounding circumstances. 
The evidence of Loring Beals is unrebutted. Urine tests cannot be "failed" or "passed" 
for purposes of Idaho Code $ 18-8004 because they do not indicate concentration or presence of 
intoxicating substances in the blood, nor any connection between those substances and 
intoxication or impairment. They can indicate the presence of drugs in the urine, and that the 
"urinater" bad at some time ingested the drug in question. That doesn't violate 5 E 8-8004. 
Simple logic therefore compels the conclusion: the department did not have competent 
evidence of violation of § 18-8004. Other facts apparent to the officer, brought forth in the 
hearing (and obvious from the facts) may be such evidence. But they have nothimg to do with 
the evidentiary test -here the urine test -whose failure or passage is the only legitimate 
departmental inquiry. Only a failure - a showing of DUI violation by that test - justifies the 
remedy the department is authorized to impose under $18-8002A. 
Only the result of the urine sample should have been the focus of the hearing before the 
department. The arrest, probable cause to test for DUI and affidavit of the officer began the 
process of departmental action, but that evidence neither authorized nor even commenced this 
proceeding at the administrative level. No evidentiasy test was before the department; no 
remedy was authorized nor was any remedial proceeding possible under the law. There had to 
be results of a chemical evidentiary test. The urine test. Not the standardized field sobriety tests, 
circumstances, vehicle accident, observations of defendant's condition or other "competent 
evidence." None of that material authorized suspension by the department under 18-8002(A). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The evidentiary test-singular-results were the urine test analysis of the lab. Once 
received by the department, that reading authorized it to take action to impose the remedy of 
suspension. That action is in fact a ministerial act. The hearing was only supposed to review it. 
Petitioner urges the court look at the facts and the statute as written and applied - the 
law and the facts as the legislature intended them to operate. The legal principles of judicial 
forbearance petitioner will leave to respondent. What it did with the "drug test" was here clearly 
outside the authority of the department and beyond the reach of the clear terms of the statute, and 
beyond the design of the statutory mechanism. Respondent's suspension of petitioner's 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV OC 08 00408 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* 
This case is an administrative appeaI from a decision by a hearing examiner of the 
Idaho Department of Transportation sustaining the administrative license suspension of 
petitioner pursuant to Idaho Code 4 18-8002A. For reasons stated, I reverse. 
Pacts and Procedural History 
In July of 2007, Feasel was involved in a minor traffic accident in Boise, Idaho. 
Police responded, and during their investigation at the scene they determined that Feasel 
exhibited impaired memory, slurred speech and the inability to perform a set of field 
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sobriety tests. Feasel advised the investigating officer that he had taken a number of 
prescription medications, including Ambien, Lithium, Wellbutrin and Prozac. 
Feasel.was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and taken 
to the public safety building. There, he was administered a breath alcohol test, which 
returned a reading of .00/.00. He then provided a urine sample that was sent to the Idaho 
State Police Laboratories for testing. The result, which was returned in October of 2007, 
revealed only the presence of fluoxetine, which is the generic name for the brand name 
"Prozac." 
ARer receipt of the state laboratory results, the investigating police officer issued 
a notice of administrative license suspension. Upon timely request, a hearing was 
scheduled before a hearing examiner of the Idaho Transportation Department. 
At hearing, the label from the prescription drug "Prozac" was read into the record. 
This label warned that use of the drug "may cause drowsiness," and cautioned that taking 
the medication "may lessen your ability to drive ...."' Feasel testified that he had been 
on Prozac (fluoxetine) for three years and had never noticed a problem with this drug. 
(Evidence was also offered on the other drugs, but none of the other drugs were revealed 
in the laboratory test. The evidence pertaining to the other drugs, then, is not relevant 
here.) 
The hearing examiner concluded that under LC. 9 18-8002A, the testing for drugs 
need not contain a quantification but only an indication of the presence of a drug together 
with indications of impairment. He concluded that the circumstances above, coupled with 
the state lab test revealing only the presence of fluoxetine was sufficient to sustain the 
' Hearing Transcript, page 1 1  
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administrative suspension. A final order sustaining the suspension was entered. Petitioner 
then filed a timely appeal to this court. 
Analysis 
The statute under examination reads as follows: 
I.C. 5 18-8002A(4) Suspension: (a) Upon receipt of the sworn statement 
of a peace officer that there existed legal cause to believe a person had 
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances and 
that the person submitted to a test and the test results indicated an alcohol 
concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in 
violation of $ 5  18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the 
department shall suspend the person's driver's license, driver's permit, 
driving privileges or nonresident driving privileges. 
As is germane here, this statute has two requirements: first the officer 
must have legal cause to believe that the subject was driving under the influence 
of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substance, and second, there must be a test 
result indicating the presence of that alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substance 
in violation of the statutes. 
A distinction must be drawn between the requirements of this statute when 
examining a circumstance of alcohol intoxication as opposed to drugs or other 
intoxicating substances. In the case of alcohol intoxication, the legal connection 
between driving and impairment can be provided through the lay opinion of the 
investigating officer. Under traditional common law principles of evidence, lay 
opinion testimony on drunkenness or stage of intoxication is admissible. Finally, 
it is common knowledge, and does not require expert qualification or foundation, 
that ingestion of a sufficient quantity of alcohol will impair one's ability to 
operate a motor vehicle. All that is required for the investigation part of the ALS 
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showing is the officer's testimony that, upon sufficient investigation, he found 
that the subject (1) had been driving, (2) had been drinking, and (3) was impaired. 
The testing in alcohol cases, then, must demonstrate that the quantity of alcohol 
found is sufficient to violate the provision of the law- i.e., a BAC of 0.08 or 
greater. Note that in the case of an administrative suspension for alcohol 
intoxication, the state does not have to prove that the amount of alcohol or degree 
of intoxication was sufficient to cause the impairment of ability to drive - in fact, 
in an administrative license suspension hearing such proof would be irrelcvant, 
because the ALS statute requires evidentiary testing to show the necessary 
quantity. 
In the case of intoxication by drug or other intoxicating substances, 
however, the same structure of proof does not necessarily apply. All drugs are not 
alike, the term "intoxicating substance" is not defined, the testing described in the 
statute does not spell out any quantities, and there are no legal or evidentiary 
presumptions available to close any gaps. Without something more, the lay 
opinion of the investigating officer may not be sufficient to link together the 
circumstance of driving, drug ingestion and impairment. 
Here, the most the officers could testify to was that Feasel demonstrated 
certain elements of impairment - slurred speech, impaired memory and affected 
gait. It might have appeared that he was under the influence of alcohol, in which 
case the officer's opinion on public drunkeness might have sufficed - but the 
BAC testing dispelled that suspicion. Upon inquiry, the subject did acknowledge 
that he had prescriptions for a number of medications - Ambien, Wellbutrin, 
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Lithium and Prozac, and the officer does state in his affidavit that Feasel had 
"knowledge that he was not to operate a motor vehicle while taking these 
medications,"' but there is no linkage in the affidavit to show that any of the 
medications are, in fact, intoxicating substances, or that they could or did cause 
the impairments demonstrated at the scene. There is no foundation in the record 
that would support opinion testimony by either of the investigating officers that 
the subject was under the influence of any of the specific drugs at the time of his 
arrest, or even that the identified substances were intoxicating at all. 
Feasel testified at the hearing that he had been taking Prozac for three 
years without any noticeable effect. The label from the Prozac bottle was read into 
evidence at the hearing, which indicated only that the drug "may" cause 
drowsiness and cautioned that the user should determine its affect before 
operating motor vehicles or heavy equipment. A toxicologist testified that the 
cautionary label was one commonly included with many prescription medications, 
and was not particular to the drug Prozac. It is unclear whether simple drowsiness 
would be sufficient to constitute intoxication under the law, and there was no 
evidence that Prozac in any quantify could cause the impairment of short term 
memory, slurred speech or affected gait. 
The state argues that all it has lo show to meet the first requirement of the 
statute is that the subject was in actual control of a motor vehicle, which is not 
Probable Cause Affidavit, State's Exhibit 2. The officer does not indicate in the affidavit how this was 
communicated to him. I note that Feasel was also cited for driving on a suspended license at the time, 
suggesting that this circumstance, rather than the medications, might have been why he would say he 
should not have been driving. In any event, even the admission of the suspect, without expert qualification, 
would not be sufficient to prove the necessary causal linkage of the identified dntg to the circumstances in 
this case. 
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challenged here, and that the subject was under the influence of a drug or other 
intoxicating substance. It is this latter part of the required showing that causes 
problems in this case. The state argues that all it need show to satisfy the 
requirement of "under the influence" is that there be some degree of impairment 
in the presence of the identified substance -which is all that is required for 
alcohol intoxication. However, as noted above, the structure of proof under the 
statute is entirely different where alcohol is the intoxicating substance. In alcohol 
cases, the state does not need to prove proximate cause, because the linkage is 
specified by statute - the evidentiary testing to a specific quantity of alcohol in 
blood, breath or urine, which quantity is specifically proscribed in the statute. 
With respect to drugs or other intoxicating substances, however, there is 
no specific quantity set forth in the statute or returned in the test  result^.^ In this 
case, then, structuring ihe argument on the same framework as an alcohol 
intoxication case falls into the logical trap of post hoc ergopropter hoc - after 
this therefore because of it - one of the major logical fallacies. It is not logically 
sufficient for the proof of a proposition to argue that merely because one event 
follows another that the first caused the latter without proving the causal 
connection with competent evidence or compelling circumstances. Here, the mere 
3 In this context, one does not "fail" a urine test for the presence of drugs, in the same context that one can 
"fail" a BAC for alcohol. All that is returned on a urine test for the presence of dugs a positive or negative 
for the identified drug - the test says nothing about the quantity of drug present in the subject's system, or 
of the temporal relationship between ingestion of the drug and the test. Depending upon the half-life of the 
drug in question the temporal relation may be a matter of hours to a matter of weeks. Given this, it is 
unclear whether the results of the urine test in this case would have been sufficient under the statute in any 
case. The statute, I.C. $ 18-8002A(4) set forth above, requires that the test indicate the presence of the drug 
"in violation of '  cited sections of the statutes. Since here, the test result only states the presence of the drug, 
which alone is not a violation of any statute, hut does not state any quantity or other indicia from which 
some violation of law might be found, the test used in this case may not be sufficient. This depends upon a 
grammatical dissection of the sentence, and a syntactical evaluation of where to attach the final 
prepositional phrase quoted above, which is unnecessary to my evaluation in this case. 
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taking of Prozac is not sufficient, standing alone, to prove that the impairments 
that were later observed were caused by it. 
In fact, other possibilities are, to my mind, equally probable. The 
impairments may have been because of a medical disorder or physical disability 
and not the medications, which would not have been a violation of the statute. The 
impairments may have been because of one of the other medications and not the 
Prozac -but the ALS statute requires a linkage between the intoxicating 
substance and the evidentiary testing, without which the administrative 
suspension is not available. The state cannot rely upon circumstantial evidence to 
supply the missing foundation. 
Without competent evidence that Prozac is an intoxicating substance, 
meaning competent proof that taking Prozac in sufficient quantities will cause 
impairment together with evidence that a sufficient quantity had, in fact, been 
taken, or competent evidence that the elements of impairment - the slurred 
speech, memory deficits and affected gait - are impairments that, in fact, do result 
from taking Prozac, the essential linkage required to show a violation of LC. 5 18- 
8004 is missing. 
I conclude that the proof in this case was insufficient to state a legal cause 
as required under the first prong of LC. 5 18-8002A(4). 
Conclusion 
The order of the Idaho Transportation Department suspending the driving 
license of Gary Alan Feasel is reversed. The case is remanded with directions to 
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reinstate the petitioner's driving privileges and dismiss the action. Costs to the 
petitioner. 
- 
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
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TRANSPORTATION, 1 
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TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PETITIONER, GARY ALAN FEASEL, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEY, ROBERT A. WALLACE, 815 PARK BLVD., SUITE 130, BOISE, 
IDAHO 83712, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
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Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision entered in the above-entitled action on 
the 2"* day of September 2008, the Honorable D. Duff McKee presiding. 
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2.  The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the order 
described in Paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(2), 
I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is as follows: Whether the 
district court erred in finding no legal cause to believe that Petitioner-Appellee was under the 
influence of drugs or other intoxicating substances such that the Idaho Transportation 
Department was proper in suspending Petitioner-Appellee's driver's license pursuant to Idaho 
Code 5 18-8002A(4). 
This statement of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Respondent-Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal. 
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5.  The Respondent-Appellant requests the following documents to be included in 
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(b) Administrative Record for Judicial Review; 
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1. Administrative Record For Judicial Review, filed January 17,2008. 
2. Transcript of Hearing Held November 27,2007, Boise, Idaho, filed March 17,2008. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 21st day of November, 2008. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
BY 
BRfi'Di-,EY -$= 
Deputy Clerk 
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TRANSPORTATION, 1 
Respondent-Appellant. 
A STIPULATION TO ENTER ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE INTO RECORD was filed by 
counsel on May 6,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO ENTER ADDITIONAL 
EVIDENCE INTO RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall 
include the item listed below, which accompanied this Motion, as an EXHIBIT: 
1. Audio CD labeled as Feasel - M0709761. 
@ 
DATED this &of May 2009. 
For the Supreme Court 
%{/& m 
Stephen W.  eny yon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
In the Supreme Court of the State of  Idaho 
IN THE MATTER OF THE DRIVER'S 1 
LICENSE SUSPENSION OF: 
GARY ALAN FEASEL. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAH0,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, 
Supreme Court Case No. 35720 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
1 Respondent-Appellant. 1 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
MICHAEL J. KANE 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: NOV 2 2 2008 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ROBERT A. WALLACE 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
BRAD$..E,V d. 
BY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
GARY ALAN FEASEL, 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Supreme Court Case No. 35720 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
30th day of September, 2008. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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